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Ultimately, despite the help of so many, there are doubtless errors and omissions in this book. They are solely and wholly my responsibility. On the one hand, it was the nothing-much-happened election; it was the most costly race in history that ended up delivering the status quo in the White House and relatively minimal change on Capitol Hill. On the other, it marked a watershed result that may cast the Republicans into the wilderness, ideologically alienated from women, nonwhites, youth, and the "new Americans" from Latin America and Asia. On the one hand, it was a race of tight margins; just a few hundred thousand votes in four key states separated former governor Mitt Romney from the White House. The real decider was not the Republican "value set" but their organizational failures in the ground wars; they were outfought and outthought on the data-driven turnout operations in the places where it mattered (Stutts, 2012 ) . On the other hand, it was an "ass-whuppin'," in the words of Democratic consultants Carville and Greenberg ( 2012a ) , in which the Republicans were crushed in the Electoral College, fell short in almost all the main battleground states, and fared badly with virtually all demographic segments of society apart from white men and those over forty-fi ve.
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It is plausible to view 2012 as a dispiriting anticlimax after the grassroots enthusiasm of 2008's election of a lifetime. It could easily be seen as a regressive rerun of big money, negative, advertising-dominated politics as usual. Equally, it could be seen as a seminal election; it might carve the American political landscape as decisively as Franklin Delano Roosevelt's New Deal of the 1940s. Obama, just as FDR, defi ed the normal economic logic of elections. He became the fi rst incumbent since FDR to be reelected with an unemployment rate of around 8 percent. Just as FDR's victories entrenched Social Security as the untouchable "third rail" of American politics, so Obama's Affordable Care Act may come to be regarded historically as a great achievement, argues American historian Gary Gerstle (2012). Just like FDR, Obama is associated with the future, while the Republicans have become overreliant, not just on the relatively declining demographic of white men, "but on an institution -heterosexual marriage -that encompasses a smaller group of Americans than it has at any time in the past two hundred years."
Typically the aftermath of general elections generates competing narratives of success and failure as practitioners, pollsters, pundits, and academics dissect the data. In the post-2012 analyses a cluster of possibly decisive factors has emerged. Some of these are long-term factors, such as the changing demographics of the United States. "This isn't your father's America," as veteran political consultant Dick Morris told the election night NewsHour PBS program. Some are short-term factors, such as the infl uence of particular issues: the economy, social welfare, women's reproductive rights, and so on. Some factors are linked to ideology and especially its resurgence on the Republican right; Carville and Greenberg ( 2012b ) characterized the election as a "class war" for middle-income America; not "it's the economy, stupid," the slogan that propelled Bill Clinton's 1992 success, but "it's the middle class, stupid." Other factors relate to campaign effectiveness of specifi c elements, the qualities of the candidates, the effi cacy of targeted ground and air wars, and the sophistication and effi ciency of software. Fascinating and fundamental as these issues may be, it is not my purpose here to try to resolve them. In any event, consensus around the most compelling explanations will take time, as history unfolds and as analysts drill beneath the numbers, offering perspective and order to all these various elements. Rather, the point is to indicate how these debates connect to the key themes of this book: trends of political salesmanship and the signifi cance of marketing frameworks to understanding these; the importance of structures of competition in determining styles of political marketing; the relationship between ideology and the work of the political marketers; and the quest to understand exactly what is a "good" campaign, both in terms of effectiveness and more broadly with respect to systemwide democratic dimensions. The following chapters work through these issues, but for now the general point can be made by picking up just two of these themes: the signifi cance of marketing analysis and the problem of "good" campaigns.
Marketing Analysis and the 2012 Election
A marketing analysis takes the conditions of competition as a guiding principle. It is in essence an economic perspective that sees politicians and parties as goal-directed actors in direct contest with rivals for particular rewards, for example, control of issue agendas, share of the vote, or ultimately electoral victory. Modes and styles of campaigning are directly shaped by the structure of competition: oligarchy or multiparty, fi rst-past-the-post winner-take-all contests, or proportional representation where vote share across the electorate may matter more than individual constituency majorities. This emphasis on competitive structure renders marketing analysis as an alternative perspective on campaigning change compared to the usual political communication accounts that highlight mediation, media power, and communications innovation (see Chapter 1 ).
While these perspectives (competitive structure and mediation) are by no means mutually exclusive, they can lead to strikingly differentiated conclusions. Thus, from a media-centric viewpoint, If 2008 was all about the Internet, 2012 revived good oldfashioned "big money" TV advertising wars, with some estimates at nearly $1 billion spent on advertising in the ten battleground states of Ohio, Florida, Virginia, Colorado, Iowa, North Carolina, Nevada, Wisconsin, New Hampshire, and Pennsylvania. Campaigns & Elections reported that about $197 million was spent on political advertising, much of it negative, in Ohio alone (Trish, 2012 ) . In short, 2012 apparently returned us to pre-Internet themes: big money, powerful interests, negative television advertising, and grassroots organization.
However, from the marketing perspective, media use in this campaign was not surprising. Rather, it exemplifi ed fi erce oligopoly competition for relatively small but decisive segments of the market. In 2012 the standout political marketing lesson was pinpoint micro-targeting enabled by "Big Data." The "Obama team assembled a team of top-notch technical talent and developed one of the most sophisticated data-driven marketing campaigns the world has ever seen," according to an admiring analysis in Forbes magazine (Severinghaus, 2012 ) . Vast data banks combining electoral rolls and household-and individual-level consumer Preface xix and social media information facilitated personalized targeting for messaging and fund-raising. Data analysis underpinned all aspects of communication, whether through video advertising to specifi c program audiences, social media messaging, or personal contacting via the telephone or on the doorstep. Among campaigners, both in the United States and elsewhere, the Obama camp's data advantage has come to be regarded as one of the decisive factors infl uencing the result. "Big Data," allied to intelligent analysis and military-precision organization, is the key lesson of 2012.
From the perspective of marketing analysis, this was predictable; the trend toward data-informed micro-targeting has been evident in both politics and commerce for some time. Data mining, including cookie-enabled tracking of online consumer behavior, has led to the applied "science" of "predictive analytics" in the retail sector, to facilitate marketing to ever more precisely identifi ed potential customers. Especially in times of relative austerity, business is forced to work harder for a smaller slice of the pie. Predictive analysis enables companies not to wait until customers come through the door, but to approach selected targets much earlier in the purchase decision-making process. Bob Moritz, chairman of PricewaterhouseCoopers, described the data effect as transformational, using the example of a large mortgage insurer (Hellweg, 2013 ) . Typically customers would seek out insurance agents only after they had already selected a house, he said: "We worked with the insurer to supply the agents with more data so they could contact clients further upstream, say three months before the purchase. Then they could provide information on the insurance, obviously, but also on the demographics of the area, comparable homes with insurance info, data on schools -that kind of thing. The data turned what had been a transaction into a service and an experience."
A similar process is evident in the 2012 presidential election. Two fi erce rivals competing in a relatively diminishing market exploited data to target potential supporters. Both the Obama and Romney campaigns "broke new ground" in data exploitation (Trish, 2012 ) , sifting through personal information on Preface xx spending patterns, cultural tastes, church attendance, and so on to approach and motivate possible donors, activists, and voters. The main difference between them is that Obama waged the more effective Big Data war. His dream team of software engineers, with experience in Facebook, Twitter, and Google, is credited with amassing more volunteers and small donors than they had in 2008 and with running an awesomely effi cient turnout operation on Election Day. In contrast, Romney's digital data platform, Orca, famously crashed on polling day (Madrigal, 2012 ).
The "Good" Campaign
It is clear already that it is nearly impossible to talk about the 2012 election and not engage with that key question: what is a good campaign? The election exposed once again some raw democratic nerves. The highly polarized and aggressive character of American political discourse has been a matter of public concern for some years now, and the 2012 campaigns were remarkable for the amount of attack ads in the national races. It is well known that citizens dislike the mudslinging, and Pew's exit polls ( 2012 ) tell us that voters hated the ugly negativity, resented a lack of debate about substantive issues, and graded the candidates' campaigns lower than their counterparts in 2008. The potentially corrupting infl uence of big money, a perennial theme of American politics, emerged with intensifi ed force following the Citizens United ruling. It was not just the basic issue of fairness and inequality of resources, but also that vast sums of money from corporations and wealthy donors could avoid disclosure, being funneled through a succession of political action committees, such that it is nearly impossible to trace the original source. A further, and relatively new, trouble spot is exposed by Big Data. Its prominence now in commerce and politics inevitably raises issues of the invasion of privacy of unwitting citizens. Moreover, in politics there are fundamental issues at stake. Just what constitutes a good campaign is a driving question of this book, and we can see even from this limited discussion that there are two key strands in play. The fi rst concerns the democratic dimensions: how closely did this campaign match up to requirements for free and fair elections, in which informed citizens express preferences and judgments about competing candidates' track records, issue stances, and general visions for a common future? Elections provide key tests of the well-being of democracy, the quality of the information environment, and the extent of public knowledge and citizen engagement, political responsiveness to public concerns, and accountability for political actions. The second strand has to do with effectiveness; it is most typically, but by no means exclusively, the practitioner perspective. What worked? What turned this election? What factors could have been infl uenced by strategy and tactics, and what were outside campaigners' control? Did the campaign matter at all in infl uencing the outcome?
There is a common tendency to view these two, the practitioner and democratic dimensions perspectives, as being in confl ict with each other. The pragmatic, if you like, is posed as the enemy of the ideal. The cold reality of an imperfect world will tempt practitioners (the political marketers) to do the graceless necessary: to go negative, to hide and bias information, to reduce voters to crunched numbers, to be bland rather than bold, to court the money and marginalize the masses. In this view, perhaps Obama's victory of 2012 is a dismal return to politics as usual; from the electrifying heights of hope, change, and popular participation to the ugly pragmatics of what it takes to win. Equally, pragmatism is frequently opposed to ideological principle. Karl Rove, in particular, has become the whipping boy among Republican right-wingers, still astonished by the party's failure to topple a relatively weak incumbent beset by the worst economic crisis since the Great Depression. Rove wielded his considerable infl uence to promote the (relatively speaking) pragmatic candidate and marginalize or even attack the likes of Newt Gingrich, Sarah Preface xxii Palin, Rick Perry, Herman Cain, and so on, those who were ideologically much closer to the party's base. Super PACs associated with Rove raised and spent many millions in support of Romney and selected Senate and House candidates, the vast majority of whom were beaten. "Congrats to @Karl Rove on blowing $400 million this cycle," tweeted Donald Trump. "What a waste of money." These are familiar lines of argument in election postmortems, and by no means exclusively in the United States. There are near-global concerns about the conduct of elections and their capacity to enhance democracy and serve citizen participation, while, even if the Tea Party has engendered a particularly intense debate in the United States, it is commonplace everywhere for losing parties to search their souls and question whether defeat was due to a defi ciency or excess of ideological purity.
This book is located precisely at the intersection between pragmatism and idealism; or to put it another way, between the pragmatism of marketing practice and the ideals of democracy. It rejects a binary division between the two. Both in theory and in history, pragmatism and idealism may be often in tension but not easily separated. This connects to deeper underlying debates about the philosophy and practice of politics. Pragmatism, in the tradition of Charles S. Peirce, William James, and John Dewey, is sometimes hailed as America's great contribution to political philosophy (Westbrook, 2005 ) . Although often criticized, the tradition survives, and at its best keeps a path between the "illusions of metaphysics" and foundational "god-like" truths, and the "illusions of skepticism" (Putnam, cited in Westbrook, 2005 : 2) . Suffi ce it to say here that there are two relevant ways of considering pragmatism in relation to the 2012 election. First is the idea that assertions of "truth" are always to be judged by their practical consequences on human lives and interests. Viewed from this perspective, the key judgment on Obama 2012 is not his (democratically questionable) campaign, but what he delivers over the next four years. If, as Professor Gerstle suggests, Obamacare becomes an achievement to rank alongside Roosevelt's social security, then the conduct of his campaign is rendered pragmatically necessary. The second idea can be called www.cambridge.org © in this web service Cambridge University Press Cambridge University Press 978-0-521-83668-5 -Consumer Democracy: The Marketing of Politics Margaret Scammell Frontmatter More information Preface xxiii the "glass half full" argument; pragmatists have not abandoned ideals, but accept that change comes slowly. They choose to see partial achievement as the glass half full, rather than half empty. In both ideas, pragmatism and ideals can be thought of as bedfellows, albeit uneasy ones.
Political marketers, indeed marketers in general, might be considered the ultimate pragmatists, sometimes to the point where pragmatism, skepticism, and cynicism become horribly blurred. The realist "whatever works" imperative is not self-evidently an idealist or even improving project. It is no surprise then that when practitioners consider the "good campaign" question they focus on the effectiveness of strategies, tactics, and communication. However, even among themselves, the ideal, the democratic dimensions of a "good campaign," do register in intriguingly pragmatic ways.
Take, for example, the issue of "hate discourse." This was raised in a postelection discussion in the consultants' trade journal Campaigns & Elections . Republican consultant Tom Edmonds ( 2012 : 41) urged his fellow professionals to address "the nearly total lack of civility in the campaigns." Negative ads can provide vital information, he argued, but "any objective analysis of the recent elections would have to conclude that . . . we are quickly reaching a tipping point in civil discourse. The fact is, we've become a rude, mean-spirited, base society." Consultants, says Edmonds, have become addicted to the potency of negative campaigning and increasingly reckless about the truth of attacks on opponents. But in the wake of the 2012 results, and given the public dislike of negativity, it was clear that billions spent on negative ads achieved very little: "maybe political professionals will do the right thing simply based on pragmatism rather than principle."
Edmonds's argument touches upon a further aspect of the democratic dimensions of a good campaign: the quality of information. In fact, this became a major theme in postelection narratives of success and failure and offers a fascinating case of the blending of pragmatism and idealism. In this instance, criticism of the Republican campaign turned precisely on the relationship
